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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

The purpose of this study was to measure the culture gaps between hierarchical subgroups within
unionized utilities companies. We conducted a mixed methods study. Using archival survey data,
we compared hierarchically-defined subgroups’ perceptions of performance-linked culture traits
within five unionized utilities companies. We later conducted interviews and focus groups,
followed by qualitative coding and analysis. As compared to non-union employees, union
employees viewed their companies as substantially less involving, consistent, adaptable, and
clear about purpose and direction. Our qualitative analysis highlighted two prior management
decisions as illustrative of the contrast between high and low levels of union involvement and
clarity. Culture scholars and practitioners have suggested that leaders must align subcultures
where they exist. Our study demonstrates large culture gaps between union employees and other
subgroups and suggests that management’s involvement of the workforce in strategic decisions
may have unique consequences for how subgroups perceive and interpret the culture.

Organizational Culture;
Unions; Labor Relations;
Subcultures; Mixed-methods

The topic of labor unions has remained a source of
public interest (Hananel, 2012), with vigorous debate
around them spreading into the realms of work, politics,
and law in the United States (BBC News, 2018b), debate
that has potential implications for how employees view
their relationship with their employer. Unions are
defined as democratic workers’ organizations whose
mission is to advocate for employees’ interests
(Stinglhamber, Gillis, Teixeira, & Demoulin, 2013). In
the United States, overall union social and economic
participation is at a 97-year low (Greenhouse, 2013), as
ongoing changes, such as states’ passage of Right to
Work laws, to the legal and political environment have
weakened collective bargaining power. Despite this general decline, a number of industries and occupations
remain heavily unionized (e.g., public sector at 35.3%)
and the unionized workforce represents a large part of
the U.S. middle-class (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).
The primary reasons for forming or joining a union
are often economic: for instance, to raise earnings and
improve job security (Farber & Saks, 1980). However,
many of the surrounding factors may stem from differences in values or beliefs, or from organizational culture, more broadly. In many organizations,
unionization is preceded and followed by a labor–management relationship that is highly antagonistic
(Buttigieg, Deery, & Iverson, 2007; Klasa, Maxwell, &
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Ortiz-Molina, 2009; Logan, 2006). U.S. managers have
a history of opposing unions either through avoidance
(Logan, 2006) or through practices designed to undermine collective bargaining (Klasa et al., 2009).
U.S. workers tend to unionize as a result of dissatisfaction and perceived injustices in the workplace
(Buttigieg et al., 2007). Though the topic of unions
appears less contentious outside the United Sttes,
there are nevertheless a number of challenging cases
worldwide. A 14-day strike by Air France pilots cost the
airline more than 300 million euros (Michelson, 2014),
and more recently there was a 3-month-long labor
strike by railway workers in France (BBC News, 2018a).
Despite popular and journalistic accounts of these examples often highlighting rifts between management and
unions, no studies we are aware of have systematically
measured the organizational cultural differences that exist
within unionized organizations nor attempted to understand their genesis and consequences. While we do not
intend to minimize the economic factors associated with
unionization, it is our belief that better understanding perceptual differences around an organization’s values, beliefs,
and assumptions (i.e., organizational culture) between hierarchical subgroups may shed light around issues experienced in unionized organizations (Schein, 2009).
The present study had two major aims. First, we tested
whether there are indeed culture gaps, or differences in
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how the organizational culture is perceived within unionized organizations, and if so, we sought to characterize the
degree and nature of those gaps. The foci of our investigation were the potential cultural differences, or gaps between
hierarchical subgroups. Second, in line with culture theories, we sought to gain a deeper understanding of the
context, specifically, how hierarchical subgroups derive
unique interpretations and attributions for the culture.
This led us to identify and then codify several historical
events as particularly meaningful to the emergence of
observed culture gaps. A better understanding of the nature
of the differences in organizational cultural perceptions
experienced by employees in a unionized company, along
with an understanding of why these differences may exist,
has the potential to help both management and labor
union leadership in determining the source of the issues
they may be experiencing.
Organizational culture and culture gaps
Elliot Jacques’s (1951) detailed characterization of the
informal social structures within the Glacier Metal
Company in The Changing Culture of a Factory helped
to provide an explicit introduction to the concept of
organizational culture and preceded significant works
by Pettigrew (1979) and Smircich (1983), which
launched the disciplined study of organizational culture
as an important scholarly domain. Over the last
35 years, scholars have advanced and debated a number
of theoretical perspectives and definitions for what
makes up an organization’s culture (e.g., Denison,
1996). Generally, most scholars now agree that culture
is broadly encompassing of the values, beliefs, and
assumptions that are held by the members of an organization and that facilitate shared meaning and behavioral norms (Alvesson, 2011; Ashkanasy, Wilderom, &
Peterson, 2000; Schein, 1992).
Theory and research also underscore the potential for
variation and multiple cultures or subcultures coexisting
within single organizations (Hofstede, 1998; Martin, 1992;
Martin & Meyerson, 1988; Sackmann, 1992). Schein
(2009) described subculture formation as a natural consequence of organizational maturation and growth, as
new groups of employees challenge, modify, or replace
the dominant or mainstream culture over time. As these
subcultures evolve they have the potential to diverge from
one another and take on a variety of arrangements.
Martin and Siehl (1983) described how subcultures can
exist independently of the dominant culture or in a way
that is either enhancing or contradictory.
Countercultures, or subcultures that emerge in direct
contrast to the dominant norms and values, have received
the greatest attention (Martin & Siehl, 1983). This is

because countercultures that diverge in significant ways
are regarded as a threat to the performance and survival of
the organization (Chatman & Cha, 2004; Gordon &
DiTomaso, 1992; Hofstede, 1998; Schein, 2009; Van
Maanen & Barley, 1985). In contrast, organizations that
build a high level of internal alignment around productive
norms and values—such as strong involvement of people
and intense focus on customers—are seen as having
a distinct performance and competitive advantage
(Barney, 1986; Chatman & Cha, 2003; Sackmann, 2011).
As such, Schein (2009) has described how it is an essential
role of leaders to become aware of subcultures, determine
where they exist, and bring them into alignment.
Following from these perspectives, we define culture
gaps as the degree to which subgroups diverge in their
views or perceptions of the organization’s culture.
Defined as a matter of degree, wider gaps connote greater
subgroup disagreement or more extremely divergent perceptions about the cultural norms and values that characterize the organization. In order to measure these gaps in
the present study, we first needed to resolve two key questions: (a) Where, internal to unionized organizations,
should one look for culture gaps? (b) What cultural content
or construct dimensions should be the focus of the investigation? In the sections that follow, we draw on existing
research and theory to describe our focus on hierarchical
subgroups and performance-linked culture traits.
Hierarchical subgroups
Koene, Boone, and Soeters’s (1997) discussion of three
primary forces is useful to explain why cultural divergence
is likely along hierarchical lines. First, organizational
structures around hierarchy create and reinforce
shared day-to-day work experiences within different levels
of organizations, as well as varying access to formal
sources of power, reward, and leadership. Second, social
interactionism—the informal social networks and channels that guide how often and under what circumstances
people interact—is often nested within the formal hierarchy but can also diverge in important ways. Third, shared
demography explains how people tend to form themselves
into homogeneous subgroups based on shared personal
backgrounds, values, and preferences. The unique attraction, selection, and attrition pressures that exist for managerial (often white-collar) versus nonmanagerial (often
blue-collar) occupations further elucidate how demography is likely to reinforce subgrouping of people at different
levels of organizations (Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith,
1995).
In combination, the Koene et al. (1997) primary forces
are likely to contribute to the cultural norms and values
that exist and cohere within hierarchical subgroups, and,
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in so doing, widen the culture gaps that exist between
them. Trice and colleagues (e.g., Trice, 1993; Trice &
Beyer, 1993; Trice & Morand, 1991) explain how manager
subcultures cohere as a result of the demanding and
complex pressures that are unique to formal leadership
roles, in addition to the social gatherings, development
opportunities, and confidential information and power
that only managers have access to. Similarly, nonmanager
subcultures cohere based on the nature of the work, the
social interactions, and the many routines and traditions
that bind people together on the front lines of the organization. Adding to these factors, Fortado (1992, 2001)
describes how conflict with management and unsatisfactory working conditions often give rise to nonmanager
subcultures.
In support of these arguments, a small number of
empirical culture studies have reported differences between
managers and nonmanagers. For example, Toczyska
(1996) found that perceptions of organizational culture
were a stronger predictor of manager versus nonmanager
status than was age, gender, ethnicity, or worldview. In
a study of a large Danish insurance company, Hofstede
(1998) found evidence of a professional subculture among
managers and specialized staff, which was characterized as
more pragmatic, less results oriented, and less employee
oriented than the overall culture of the organization.
One clear limitation of existing research is the rather
broad categorization of hierarchical subgroups into managers and nonmanagers. Unfortunately, combining managers whose role is strategic leadership with managers
whose role is operational supervision overlooks the structural, social, and demographic forces that likely shape the
culture of these distinct subgroups in unique ways (Koene
et al., 1997). For this reason, we believe it is important to
define the hierarchical subgroups in a manner that allows
these potential differences to be observed, and have done so
in the present study by differentiating supervisors and
upper managers, as well as nonsupervisory union and
nonunion employees. Specifically, we focused on three
hierarchical levels: nonsupervisors (made up of union
employees and nonunion employees), supervisors, and
upper managers. Almost half of the nonsupervisory sample
was part of the union, while no supervisors or upper
managers held union membership.
Performance-linked culture traits
Though hierarchical levels can be used to target the potential location of culture gaps inside organizations (i.e., where
to look), one must still resolve what to look for. Culture
scholars generally agree that the content of organizational
culture can be dimensionalized, so that multiple elements
can be theorized and measured. However, there remains
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debate regarding the specific dimensions, labels, and configurations that best represent these elements and also
recognition that different models serve different research
purposes (Ashkanasy, Broadfoot, & Falkus, 2000).
Unfortunately, dimensionalized models have not
been embraced within the subcultures literature. For
example, we are aware of no theories specifying which
elements of culture specifically are most likely to
diverge or converge among hierarchical subgroups.
While a limited number of studies have been descriptively helpful, the empirical literature as a whole falls
well short of a generalizable knowledge base on which
to build more powerful theories. Furthermore, existing
studies have used descriptive measures and dimensions,
such that the consequences of observed culture differences are unclear for the individuals and organizations
studied (e.g., Hofstede, 1998; Toczyska, 1996).
For these reasons, we grounded our research within
a prescriptive model and theory that identify several key
cultural traits or dimensions that have been linked to
organizational performance. These traits represent perceptions of the organization’s culture and the respondent’s
understanding of the how things are done in the organization. In doing so, the measure captures the fundamental
beliefs and assumptions of the organization via more visible cultural artifacts (Denison, Nieminen, & Kotrba, 2014).
Differences, or gaps, on these dimensions thus not only
would indicate a difference in values but also would imply
a difference in belief about the effectiveness of the organizational culture in question. In other words, gaps in culture
would suggest a fundamental dissent between groups in
what is working well. Denison and Mishra (1995) developed four broad cultural traits, which subsume three
indexes each that reflect cultural effectiveness. Rather
than working to describe an organization’s values, they
adopted a performance-oriented approach in developing
these dimensions to identify cultural aspects that promote
greater organizational effectiveness by first identifying
high- and low-performing organizations. Specifically, they
describe organizations as most effective when they find
ways to engage, develop, and empower their people as
individuals and within teams (involvement), facilitate coordinated actions and promote consistency of behaviors
through core business values and integrity (consistency),
translate the demands of the customer to responsive and
anticipatory actions (adaptability), and provide a clear
sense of purpose and mission that bridges day-to-day
performance objectives with the long-term vision (mission). The subdimensions, or indexes, of these traits are
further defined in Table 1 and are measured via the
Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS).
Denison and Mishra (1995) further explained that by exhibiting greater intensity on each trait, organizations can

30

L. R. G. NIEMINEN ET AL.

Table 1. Definitions of culture traits and indexes from the DOCS.
Effectiveness traits and corresponding index definitions
1. Involvement concerns the personal engagement of individuals within
the organization and reflects a focus on the internal dynamics of the
organization and on flexibility.
1.1. Empowerment—Individuals have the authority, initiative, and
ability to manage their own work. This creates a sense of ownership
and responsibility toward the organization.
1.2. Team orientation—Value is placed on working cooperatively
toward common goals for which all employees feel mutually
accountable. The organization relies on team effort to get work done.
1.3. Capability development—The organization continually invests in
the development of employee’s skills in order to stay competitive and
meet on-going business needs.
2. Consistency refers to shared values, and efficient systems and
processes, and reflects an internal and stable focus.
2.1. Core values—Members of the organization share a set of values
that create a sense of identity and a clear set of expectations.
2.2. Agreement—Members of the organization are able to reach
agreement on critical issues. This includes both the underlying level of
agreement and the ability to reconcile differences when they occur.
2.3. Coordination and integration—Different functions and units of the
organization are able to work together well to achieve common goals.
Organizational boundaries do not interfere with getting work done.
3. Adaptability refers to employees’ ability to understand what the
customer wants, to learn new skills, and to change in response to
demand. The focus of adaptability is external and flexible.
3.1. Creating change—The organization is able to create adaptive ways
to meet changing needs. It is able to read the business environment,
react quickly to current trends, and anticipate future changes.
3.2. Customer focus—The organization understands and reacts to its
customers and anticipates their future needs. This reflects the degree
to which the organization is driven by a concern to satisfy its
customers.
3.3. Organizational learning—The organization receives, translates, and
interprets signals from the environment into opportunities for
encouraging innovation, gaining knowledge, and developing
capabilities.
4. Mission refers to an organization’s purpose and direction, and reflects
a focus external to the organization and on stability.
4.1. Strategic direction and intent—Clear strategic intentions convey
the organization’s purpose and make it clear how everyone can
contribute and “make their mark” on the industry.
4.2. Goals and objectives—A clear set of goals and objectives can be
linked to the mission, vision, and strategy, and can provide everyone
with a clear direction in their work.
4.3. Vision—The organization has a shared view of a desired future
state. It embodies core values and captures the hearts and minds of
the organization’s people, while providing guidance and direction.

more effectively balance the dynamic tensions created by
internal and external sources of influence and the need for
both stability and flexibility (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Quinn & Cameron, 1988).
To further support the prescriptive nature of this model,
prior studies investigating these culture dimensions have
reported positive linkages with a range of performance
outcomes (e.g., Denison et al., 2014), as well as empirical
support for the theorized importance of balancing strengths
across culture traits (Kotrba et al., 2012; Yilmaz & Ergun,
2008). This prescriptive approach is further bolstered by
comprehensive qualitative and quantitative reviews of the
culture-performance literature that have found similar support for the direct, positive effects of culture dimensions
that focus on collaboration, innovation, and market focus
(Hartnell, Ou, & Kinicki, 2011; Sackmann, 2011).

The present study
Despite the important role that unions continue to play
worldwide, very few studies have examined the culture of
unionized organizations. Descriptive differences between
union and nonunion culture have been observed in two
studies. Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990)
compared the cultural work practices among 20 groups
from Denmark and the Netherlands. As compared to
nonunion employees, union employees reported lower
results orientation—valuing the process of work more
than the outcome of work—and lower professionalism—
finding the organization as a stronger source of personal
identity than one’s profession or occupation. A second
study by Tang, Kim, and O’Donald (2000) found that
union workers in automotive plants in the United States
perceived the culture to be less family and team oriented
and have a less open communication style as compared to
nonunion workers in automotive plants in Japan.
Coupled with research on hierarchical subcultures
(Fortado, 1992; Toczyska, 1996; Trice, 1993), these findings
suggest that culture gaps might be prominent across the
hierarchical subgroups of unionized organizations in particular. In other words, the cultural divergence that may be
naturally present due to hierarchical subgroup differentiation (Koene et al., 1997) might be further amplified or
accelerated by a codifying union presence within one or
more of the subgroups. As was true in the present study,
many unionized organizations are represented only at the
nonmanagerial level. This means that union employees
may perceive and experience the culture differently from
both their nonunion nonmanagerial colleagues and the
layers of management above. Moreover, the studies by
Hofstede (1998) and Tang et al. (2000) generally suggest
that union employees perceive a less effective or positive
culture than other organizational subgroups, as well as
lower job satisfaction and less favorable perceptions of
work and job characteristics (Artz, 2010; Berger, 1983;
Guest & Conway, 2004; Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Meng,
1990). Based on this general pattern, we hypothesized the
following:
Hypothesis 1: Within unionized companies, hierarchical subgroups differ in their perceptions of performance-linked culture traits.
Hypothesis 2: The largest difference in perceptions of
performance-linked culture traits occurs between union
employees and the other hierarchical subgroups, such that
the union employees perceive the culture less positively.
Our hypotheses specify culture gaps generically
across the performance-linked culture traits theorized
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by Denison and Mishra (1995). At the same time, we
recognize that the magnitude of observed culture gaps
might vary when looking at specific dimensions of culture. We also sought to better understand what contextual factors and historical events might help to account
for such differences if they exist. In lieu of previous
research and theory to help disentangle these issues, we
state the following as exploratory research questions:
Research Question 1: On which performance-linked
culture indexes are the perceived differences between
hierarchical subgroups greatest in magnitude?
Research Question 2: What contextual factors or events
help to account for observed culture gaps between
hierarchical subgroups?

Method
Culture scholars have adopted different quantitative
and qualitative methodologies following from different
philosophical perspectives (for a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of the organizational culture literature see
Denison, 1996). Our approach in the present research
is best characterized as pragmatic. The pragmatic
worldview focuses on actions, situations, and consequences and is primarily concerned with solutions to
problems, rather than adherence to a particular methodology. As such, pragmatism is considered to be the
philosophical underpinning for mixed-methods
research (Creswell, 2009).
In this study, we used a sequential, mixed-methods
design. The study’s hypotheses were tested using
a quantitative analysis of previously collected archival survey data. A later qualitative analysis of interviews and focus
groups allowed us to expand on these findings within
a subsample of the companies and hierarchical subgroups.
A consistent critique of culture research and quantitative
studies in particular is that studies have not sufficiently
considered the industry context. With this in mind, we
firmly grounded our investigation in a specific industry
setting by studying unionized utilities companies.

Quantitative methodology
Sample
Our quantitative analysis focused on previously collected archival survey data. Culture surveys were gathered from five unionized, public utilities companies
that provide natural gas and electricity to commercial
and residential customers in the United States. At the
time of the study, the five companies shared a common
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parent company, a publicly owned and traded energy
group with annual revenues in excess of $5 billion.
Under the parent company’s ownership, the five companies maintained semiautonomous branding and
management and continued autonomous operations
across their distinct geographical service regions.
Unfortunately, we were not able to extend our data
collection to three additional subsidiaries owned by
the same parent company at the time of our study.
In each of the five companies, a census methodology
was used with all full-time employees invited to participate. The overall response rate across companies was
49.95%. This was better than the 35.7% mean response
rate (SD = 18.8) for organizational surveys that was
reported in Baruch and Holtom’s (2008) review. Data
restrictions precluded the necessary information needed
to compute the specific response rates for each company
and subgroup. In total, the survey respondents included
599 union employees, 674 nonunion employees, 269
supervisors, and 29 upper managers (n = 1,571). In one
of the five companies, which we have labeled Company C,
no upper managers were identified as survey respondents.
This was the only subgroup not represented in our quantitative analyses across the five companies.
Union employees held a range of skilled and semiskilled nonsupervisory jobs (e.g., electrician and installation). Nonunion employees included nonunionized,
nonsupervisory support and administrative staff from
the corporate offices and district shops. Supervisors
were responsible for the day-to-day supervision of
front-line employees in the district shops and in the
field. Upper managers included senior leaders of the
companies who were responsible for business operations and strategy at the regional and corporate level.
Together, the definition of the four subgroups sheds
light on two interrelated factors in the present work context:
hierarchy and unionization. Overall, the groups are hierarchically defined by three levels: nonsupervisors, supervisors, and upper managers. Union employees were at the
nonsupervisory level, though not all nonsupervisory
employees were unionized. In these companies only the
nonsupervisory employees who hold skilled or semiskilled
trade occupations can join a union. Union employees comprised 47% of the total nonsupervisory employee sample.
The inclusion of both union and nonunion employees at
the same hierarchical level is an important feature of
the study design because this helps to partially disentangle
the unique role of hierarchy and union membership within
the observed pattern of findings. While a fully crossed, or
fully factorial, design would be even more desirable for this
purpose, we note in the Limitations section that this was not
possible in the present study, given the absence of unionized supervisors and upper managers.
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Denison organizational culture survey
We measured perceptions of organizational culture
using the Denison Organizational Culture Survey
(DOCS; Denison & Neale, 1996). Data were collected
using a combination of online and paper surveys. In
total, the DOCS includes 60 Likert-type items that use
a 5-point response scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The items measure perceptions along the four aforementioned culture traits,
which are further clustered into 12 culture indexes
(five items per index). In addition, participants indicated their subgroup membership and company.
Analyses focused on the culture indexes (Table 1).
Cronbach’s alphas for the indexes ranged from .72 to
.87, demonstrating adequate internal consistency reliability. The average correlation among the indexes was .66
and ranged from .50 to .80. See Table 2 for means and
standard deviations. Full details regarding scale validity
and reliability, such as confirmatory factor analysis and
tests of criterion-related validity, were summarized by
Denison et al. (2014).

Analytic strategy
We conducted a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using subgroup and company as
predictors and the 12 aforementioned culture indexes
as dependent variables. Company was included in the
model to test whether the presence and nature of the
hypothesized subgroup culture gaps varied by company. A nonsignificant company by subgroup interaction would suggest that any subgroup differences were
not due to the company in question, while a significant
main effect of subgroup would suggest subgroup differences, or a culture gap, across hierarchical levels on the
cultural indexes.

Qualitative methodology
The qualitative analysis included representatives from
two of the five utilities companies (Company C and
Company D), and in each case, three of the four subgroups. In total, 24 union employees, 12 supervisors, and
seven upper managers participated. Thirty-nine of the
participants were male, and four were female. Age ranges,
in years, were as follows: 20–29 (n = 1), 30–39 (n = 3),
40–49 (n = 16), 50–59 (n = 13), and 60–69 (n = 1); nine
did not report their age range. The average tenure within
the subsample was 21.9 years (SD = 8.87). The shortcomings of using a convenience sample and our inability
to capture nonunion employees in the qualitative analysis
are further discussed in the Limitations section.
Qualitative data was collected approximately 2 years
following the collection of the archival survey data on
which the quantitative analyses are based. Seven 60minute phone interviews were conducted individually
with upper managers. Additionally, a total of seven 90minute focus groups were conducted, five with union
employees and two with supervisors. Each focus group
had between 2 and 10 participants. Interviews and focus
groups were facilitated by the study’s primary author
using a semistructured protocol. A second researcher
attended all data-gathering sessions to take notes.
All sessions began by assuring the confidentiality of
study participants. The culture model was introduced,
and the 12 culture indexes were defined. Next, study
participants were asked to select an area within the
model that represented a particularly difficult or challenging issue for their company. The facilitator would
then probe deeper into the focus area by asking a series
of questions to, first, ascertain real examples that illustrate the cultural challenge, and second, gain a deeper
understanding of participants’ interpretation and causal
attributions for the cultural challenge described. This

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for subgroups on culture indexes.

Culture indexes
Empowerment
Team orientation
Capability development
Core values
Agreement
Coordination and integration
Creating change
Customer focus
Organizational learning
Strategic direction and intent
Goals and objectives
Vision
* p < .05.

Union
employees

Nonunion
employees

Supervisors

Upper
managers

Overall

M (SD)
3.02 (0.83)
3.06 (0.11)
3.03 (0.10)
3.22 (0.09)
2.89 (0.09)
2.88 (0.10)
2.76 (0.09)
3.02 (0.09)
2.82 (0.09)
2.97 (0.10)
2.99 (0.09)
2.67 (0.09)

M (SD)
3.38 (0.07)
3.36 (0.07)
3.32 (0.06)
3.62 (0.06)
3.28 (0.06)
3.05 (0.06)
3.16 (0.06)
3.34 (0.06)
3.24 (0.06)
3.32 (0.07)
3.47 (0.06)
3.08 (0.06)

M (SD)
3.46 (0.07)
3.50 (0.08)
3.35 (0.07)
3.79 (0.06)
3.30 (0.07)
3.07 (0.07)
3.01 (0.06)
3.45 (0.06)
3.16 (0.07)
3.35 (0.07)
3.49 (0.07)
3.07 (0.07)

M (SD)
3.73 (0.16)
3.88 (0.17)
3.62 (0.15)
4.14 (0.14)
3.55 (0.15)
3.37 (0.15)
3.30 (0.14)
3.61 (0.14)
3.37 (0.15)
3.71 (0.17)
3.77 (0.15)
3.41 (0.15)

M (SD)
3.28 (0.81)
3.30 (0.87)
3.20 (0.76)
3.49 (0.72)
3.13 (0.73)
2.95 (0.75)
2.96 (0.69)
3.25 (0.71)
3.04 (0.75)
3.18 (0.83)
3.24 (0.77)
2.92 (0.73)
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process of identifying and probing deeper into focus
areas was repeated three to four times per session. Each
session also addressed one or more positive culture
examples in the same manner by asking about cultural
strengths.
All steps of the data coding and analysis were completed by the same researchers who conducted the data
collection. First, the detailed notes gathered from all
sessions were entered into a database and assigned
codes for subgroup and study participant. Notes were
then organized into smaller units representing single,
coherent comments. Comments were then assigned
a code indicating their thematic content and valence,
positive or negative, whenever applicable matching the
comment to one of the 12 culture indexes from the
Denison model. Two additional codes were established
for a small number of comments that generically
referred to trust and communication. Coding was
done independently by the two researchers at first,
with any differences resolved through consensus discussion. This process resulted in a total of 696 analyzable comments, including 372 from union employees,
140 from supervisors, and 184 from upper managers.

Results
Hypothesis testing
We conducted a two-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) using subgroup and company as predictors
and the 12 aforementioned culture indexes as dependent
variables. Companies differed on average in their overall
ratings of company culture (Pillai’s Trace = .05, F(48,
5904) = 1.44, p < .05). However, it was not the case that
the subgroup ratings varied systematically by company, as
evidenced by a nonsignificant subgroup by company

interaction (Pillai’s Trace = .09, F(132, 16,313) = 1.01,
p = .44), indicating meaningful culture gaps across
subgroups.
Hypothesis 1 predicted subgroup differences in perceptions of culture. This hypothesis was confirmed, as
subgroup was significant in the omnibus MANOVA
(Pillai’s Trace = .06, F(36, 4425) = 2.35, p < .001).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the largest gaps would
occur between union employees and the other subgroups, such that union employees perceive the culture
less positively. The means and Tukey’s post hoc tests
for the culture indexes (Tables 2 and 3) provide support
for this hypothesis. Table 2 shows that in all cases,
union employees provided the least positive ratings of
culture. The first three columns of Table 3 show that
these differences are statistically significant in all cases.
In contrast, nonunion employees, supervisors, and
upper managers generally do not differ in their perceptions of culture, with just a few exceptions. Nonunion
employees have significantly less positive ratings of core
values and strategic direction and intent as compared to
upper managers, as well as significantly less positive
ratings of core values as compared to supervisors.
Our first research question sought to further elaborate the nature of the subgroup gaps at the level of the
culture indexes. To explore this question, we examined
the univariate between-subjects tests of the MANOVA
(Table 4), in addition to the aforementioned Tukey’s
post hoc tests. As with the omnibus MANOVA, we first
examined the subgroup by company interactions. Only
two of the twelve interaction terms were significant,
corresponding to the core values and goals and objectives models. As displayed in Figure 1, two variations
from the general pattern are noteworthy. First, for both
indexes, Company D exhibited a less dramatic gap
between union employees and nonunion employees,
as well as a shallower slope across the subgroups,

Table 3. Mean differences for Tukey’s post hoc tests comparing subgroups.
Subgroup comparisons

Culture index
Empowerment
Team orientation
Capability development
Core values
Agreement
Coordination and integration
Creating change
Customer focus
Organizational learning
Strategic direction and intent
Goals and objectives
Vision
*p < .05.

Union employees
vs.
nonunion
employees
.38*
.47*
.28*
.48*
.35*
.25*
.29*
.36*
.36*
.38*
.47*
.38*

Union
employees
vs.
supervisors
.48*
.58*
.40*
.65*
.44*
.24*
.29*
.47*
.37*
.46*
.55*
.39*
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Union
employees
vs.
upper managers
.71*
.82*
.53*
.91*
.61*
.52*
.47*
.57*
.54*
.79*
.81*
.67*

Nonunion
employees
vs.
supervisors
.10
.10
.12
.18*
.09
.01
.00
.10
.02
.08
.08
.01

Nonunion
employees
vs.
upper managers
.33
.35
.25
.44*
.20
.26
.18
.20
.18
.41*
.35
.29

Supervisors
vs.
upper
managers
.22
.24
.13
.26
.17
.27
.18
.10
.16
.33
.26
.28
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Table 4. MANOVA test of between-subjects effects by culture index.
Culture index
Empowerment
Team orientation
Capability development
Core values
Agreement
Coordination and integration
Creating change
Customer focus
Organizational learning
Strategic direction and intent
Goals and objectives
Vision

Source
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup
Subgroup
Company
Subgroup

× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company
× company

F (dfB, dfW)

p Value

Partial η2

5.19 (3, 1484)
3.44 (4, 1484)
1.44 (11, 1484)
5.19 (3, 1484)
5.28 (4, 1484)
1.22 (11, 1484)
3.74 (3, 1484)
3.49 (4, 1484)
0.96 (11, 1484)
13.13 (3, 1484)
2.84 (4, 1484)
2.22 (11, 1484)
6.14 (3, 1484)
1.64 (4, 1484)
1.17 (11, 1484)
2.18 (3, 1484)
1.44 (4, 1484)
1.07 (11, 1484)
5.41 (3, 1484)
3.22 (4, 1484)
1.65 (11, 1484)
5.88 (3, 1484)
3.29 (4, 1484)
1.26 (11, 1484)
5.13 (3, 1484)
1.48 (4, 1484)
1.57 (11, 1484)
4.82 (3, 1484)
1.07 (4, 1484)
1.37 (11, 1484)
8.50 (3, 1484)
1.029 (4, 1484)
1.84 (11, 1484)
6.91 (3, 1484)
1.63 (4, 1484)
1.29 (11, 1484)

.001*
.010*
.148
.001*
<.001*
.266
.011*
.008*
.478
<.001*
.023*
.012*
<.001*
.162
.305
.089
.218
.387
.001*
.012*
.079
<.001*
.011*
.244
.002*
.206
.103
.002*
.369
.183
<.001*
.391
.043*
<.001*
.164
.227

.010
.009
.011
.010
.014
.009
.008
.009
.007
.026
.008
.016
.012
.004
.009
.004
.004
.008
.011
.009
.012
.012
.009
.009
.010
.004
.011
.010
.003
.010
.017
.003
.013
.014
.003
.009

Note. dfB = degrees of freedom between groups; dfW = degrees of freedom error.
* p < .05.

generally. Second, for the goals and objectives index,
Company C showed a unique pattern, where the nonunion employee ratings were more positive than the
supervisor ratings.
Interestingly, core values and goals and objectives also
demonstrated the largest subgroup effect among the 12
univariate tests, with partial η2 values of .026 and .017,
respectively, followed by vision (.014), agreement (.012),
and customer focus (.012). In contrast, the smallest and
only nonsignificant subgroup effect was observed for
coordination and integration (η2 = .004, p = .089). The
specific subgroup comparisons shown in Table 3 are
mainly consistent with the univariate results. The largest
mean differences when comparing the union employees
to the other subgroups were consistently observed for
core values, goals and objectives, and team orientation.
Qualitative analysis
Table 5 compares the frequency of comments coded along
each of the culture index themes. In total, 79% of the
comments had a negative valence, reflecting a cultural
challenge, problem, or frustration expressed by

a participant (union employees = 83.3%, supervisors = 80.7%, upper managers = 69.6%). Consistent with
the quantitative findings, core values was the most frequent
cultural challenge described, ranking first among upper
managers and supervisors and third among union employees. The second most frequent challenge was empowerment, ranking first among supervisors and second among
union employees and upper managers.
A few noteworthy differences were also observed.
Although approximately 10% of the negative comments
by union employees and supervisors focused on goals and
objectives, this was not a challenge discussed with any
frequency by upper managers. In contrast, 9% of negative
comments by upper managers referenced challenges in
creating change, whereas no union employees expressed
this concern. Similarly, more than 10% of negative comments by supervisors and upper managers focused on how
conflict gets resolved (i.e., agreement), whereas this was the
focus of only 2% of comments by union employees.
The subgroup pattern was somewhat more consistent in
the case of the positive comments. Empowerment and
team orientation ranked in the top three for all three
subgroups, in addition to capability development for
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Mean Ratings of Core Values
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Figure 1. Plots of the significant subgroup × company interactions for core values (top) and goals and objectives (bottom).

Table 5. Frequency of comments by culture theme, subgroup, and valence.
Union employees

Supervisors

Upper managers

Overall

Culture themes

Pos.

Neg.

Pos.

Neg.

Pos.

Neg.

Pos.

Neg.

Empowerment
Team orientation
Capability development
Core values
Agreement
Coordination and integration
Creating change
Customer focus
Organizational learning
Strategic direction and intent
Goals and objectives
Vision
Communicationa
Trusta

.15
.21
.05
.32
.03
.03
.03
—
—
—
.06
.02
.03
—

.16
—
.17
.15
.02
.10
—
.08
.05
.06
.10
.03
—
.03

.22
.22
.33
.07
—
—
.11
.04
—
—
—
—
—
—

.16
.04
.09
.16
.10
.12
.06
.04
—
.04
.09
.09
—
—

.16
.34
.11
.07
.07
.02
.04
.05
—
.05
.02
.04
.02
.02

.13
—
.09
.23
.13
.05
.09
—
—
.06
—
.05
.03
.05

.17
.26
.12
.18
.04
.02
.05
.06
.00
.02
.03
.02
.02
.01

.15
.02
.13
.17
.06
.10
.04
.06
.03
.06
.08
.05
.02
.03

Note. Frequencies shown are percentages in decimals, computed based on the following subtotals of comments by column: union employees positive (62),
union employees negative (310), supervisors positive (27), supervisors negative (113), upper managers positive (56), upper managers negative (128), overall
positive (145), and overall negative (551). Pos., positive; Neg., negative.
a
Comments that were related generically to communication and trust were coded into separate themes.

supervisors and upper managers. One clear exception was
core values, in which nearly one-third of union employees’
positive comments referenced the company values, versus
fewer than 10% of supervisors’ and upper managers’
comments.

Discussion
Our findings build upon the existing subculture and
union culture literatures in several important ways. For
one, our results showed clearly that the most significant
culture gaps occurred across union and nonunion lines.
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Union employees diverged from the other subgroups,
including the nonunion rank-and-file comparison
group, by consistently perceiving the culture less positively overall. Examining the full pattern of results
suggests that the ways in which the union perceived
cultural differences was quite broad, with culture gaps
observed across each of the cultural elements or traits
theorized by Denison and Mishra (1995) as foundational to organizational effectiveness. A closer examination suggests that the largest culture gaps were observed
in how union employees perceived less adherence to
company values, less clarity and alignment about the
goals, and less emphasis on the effective use of teams.
By comparison, only a few significant differences
were observed in how the nonunion employees, supervisors, and managers perceived their companies’ cultures. The lack of gaps among these subgroups differs
from what previous studies have found (e.g., Fortado,
1992, 2001; Hofstede, 1998; Trice, 1993) and might
suggest a few possibilities for future studies to test
regarding the unique cultural impact of unions and
their interaction with the culture gaps between hierarchical levels. From one perspective, the presence of
a union might amplify hierarchical culture gaps by
adding structural reinforcement of the distinction
between employees and managers. Conversely, it is
interesting to speculate based on our findings on
whether the presence of a union might serve to codify
a more coherent and inclusive in-group mentality
across the several layers of management and nonunion
personnel than might otherwise exist if the union were
not present. Future studies could test these possibilities
by systematically comparing hierarchical culture gaps
across unionized and nonunionized companies from
various industries.
The potential consequences of these culture gaps are
of utmost importance, including how they translate to
the level of performance the organizations achieve.
Because prior studies have found the culture traits to
positively relate to a wide range of performance criteria
such as sales growth, profitability, innovation, and customer satisfaction (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Denison
et al., 2014; Gillespie, Denison, Haaland, Smerek, &
Neale, 2008; Kotrba et al., 2012), it is perhaps reasonable to expect that widening culture gaps have
a negative impact on organizational effectiveness. This
is why Schein (2009) suggested that leaders must create
alignment across the subcultures that exist within organizations, and from this perspective, research can play
an important role by shedding light on the factors that
contribute to widening or narrowing gaps.
Toward this end, our qualitative analysis provided
several important layers of insight, which we elaborate

in the next section. We first comment briefly on how this
added layer of context makes implausible two possible
interpretations of our quantitative findings: (a) that union
employees are responsible, or solely responsible, for the
culture gaps they perceive, and (b) that similar culture
ratings preclude underlying differences in cultural attributions and sense-making. Instead, our qualitative analysis reveals a picture that is much more complex. For
example, as the pattern of findings for core values and
team orientation suggests, some of the most challenging
aspects of the culture can also represent deep sources of
pride. Likewise, what is viewed as a top challenge by one
group—for example, union employees’ perception of
goals and objectives—may hold less salience for another
(e.g., upper managers).
In our analysis of the qualitative data, we also observed
that the same events held very different cultural meanings
for the members of the subgroups. We noted that many of
the comments by study participants could be traced back
to two historical events in particular, both of which were
viewed and characterized as meaningful touchstones for
understanding the culture. As we subsequently describe,
these two events help to set a sharp contrast in how
strategic decisions by the upper managers achieved varying levels of involvement and clarity.
Event 1: Freeze customer rates
Approximately 4 years prior to this study, Company
C made a commitment to “freeze” customer rates.
U.S. public utilities companies set the rates that customers
pay by filing a rate case with one or more regulatory
bodies. As a result of this freeze, the company would
experience increasing pressures to lower costs in order
to remain profitable. A series of decisions was then necessary about how and where to cut costs, and some of the
decisions were negotiated with the union. One such decision involved a significant revision to the employee pension plan. After a difficult negotiation process,
management ultimately conceded to a reduction in the
pensions of all nonunion personnel, while the union was
able to protect its members from a similar reduction. Over
time, this was seen as contributing to a number of cultural
challenges related to capability development, coordination and integration, and customer focus.
We first highlight how the fallout of the rate freeze
is related to consequences regarding capability development. As mentioned earlier, upper management
was forced to cut costs internally to make up for
the loss of profits that could be gained from increasing customer rates. Accordingly, it cut pensions for
the supervisor subgroup. As a result of this loss of
pension, union employees were no longer motivated
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to seek promotion to the role of supervisor because
doing so would result in a loss of pension. Without
a desirable promotion opportunity in view, many
union employees reported low motivation to improve
their job performance and develop their skills in preparation for career advancement. Some of the supervisors who did accept a promotion later expressed
regret about their decision. To fill these supervisory
roles, the company increasingly turned to external
hires. This was an acute source of frustration for
union employees in particular, who described the
limited experience and technical skills of new supervisors as causing a lack of respect and increased
conflict in the workplace. Supervisors and upper
managers also acknowledged this as a problem, but
mainly from a succession planning perspective.
The company also increased its reliance on contractors to ameliorate the monetary constraints incurred by
the rate freeze. Upper managers and supervisors
described a strong challenge from the union and also
viewed this as creating a number of coordination challenges. Interestingly, union employees expressed mixed
reactions, generally recognizing the need to reduce
their own workload while also sharing management’s
concern over the quality of work done by the outside
contractors.
Another series of decisions made as a consequence
of the rate freeze compromised customer service. For
example, by standardizing the meter parts and specifications, the time and costs associated with custom
manufacturing and installation were greatly reduced.
However, the quality of the work suffered as a result.
The premade meters did not allow the technicians to
hide their placement behind shrubs or other visual
barriers as they had in the past. As a result, union
employees and supervisors in the field faced more
frequent complaints from customers and had less flexibility to respond to them. The premade meters also
removed a strong point of pride for technicians because
the skill and creativity that were previously needed to
perform the job were no longer required.
A final cost-cutting decision made as an outcome of
the rate freeze outsourced the call center to an agency
that was not local to the service region. This decision
had an impact on both the customer focus culture
index and the coordination and integration index.
Outsourcing the call center made it difficult to coordinate the response to customers’ needs and inquiries. As
a result, union employees’ and supervisors’ interactions
with the customers were marked by increasing conflict.
Several examples were described in which the technicians’ first interaction with the customer involved hearing and responding to complaints about the call center.
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Event 2: New safety program
A second major event involved the creation of a new
worker safety program by Company D. Union employees were involved in all aspects of designing and implementing the program, including (a) the formation of
a union-led steering committee alongside upper management, (b) the union’s active role in carrying out
safety trainings and peer observations and coaching,
(c) the rotation of a dedicated safety officer role
among union employees, and (d) weekly employee-led
safety meetings. Unlike prior attempts to involve the
union, employees were clear about the purpose of their
involvement and believed their feedback was genuinely
heard and acted on. As such, they used the safety
program to illustrate a rare, positive example of
empowerment and highlighted the new opportunities
this created for the union’s collaboration with upper
management.
Interestingly, the supervisors described the safety
program from a different perspective, detailing their
corresponding loss of power and the decline of “hard
work” values. They described how “the pendulum” had
swung too far in the direction of safety, noting how this
created an obstacle for disciplining employees for poor
performance. Once a safety concern was raised by an
employee, whether seen as legitimate or as an obstruction tactic, many supervisors simply acquiesced out of
fear that the employee would file a grievance. In contrast, managers viewed the supervisors as change resistant and eventually sent a directive indicating that
safety observations were to be respected by supervisors
and handled as off-duty, regular work assignments.
Although many union employees characterized the
safety program as a positive shift away from the traditionally punitive stance of management, others viewed
it as simply a new mode for disciplinary action. In
justification of this view, participants repeatedly mentioned the company’s 3- to 5-year retention policy on
personnel records. The policy was a consistent point of
contention with the union, described as several years
longer than other utilities companies in the area, and
was seen as a way for management to strengthen its
case when disciplining or firing employees. Several
participants explained that this was management’s
way of instilling fear among employees.

Contrasting levels of involvement and clarity
The decision to freeze customer rates by Company
C was made by upper managers without strong involvement of either supervisors or union employees. It is
interesting to consider whether it might have been
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possible to engage a committee to explore options,
discuss consequences, or solicit input about how to
best communicate with the workforce on this issue.
While it is unlikely that these steps would have
altered the decision or made it more “popular”—
because of the various difficult cost-cutting implications—perhaps taking these steps would have earned
some level of clarity and support. Instead, union
employees did not understand the circumstances or
basis of the decision, while they experienced a wide
range of negative consequences in their day-to-day
work. Supervisors described their tenuous position
of needing to communicate management’s vision to
a frustrated workforce without themselves feeling
fully informed or involved.
One of the unfortunate consequences that study
participants described was their increasingly contentious and ineffective interactions with customers.
Though the decision to freeze rates offered an important benefit to customers (i.e., lower utility costs), there
was little evidence of the workforce communicating this
benefit or otherwise demonstrating their support for
the company’s decision as part of their routine interaction with customers. Instead, the emphasis was on
empathy for customer complaints. As one union
employee described, alluding to the decision to outsource the call center function, “Customers shouldn’t
have to deal with a phone center that doesn’t know the
business.”
From a management perspective, this example illustrates a failure to gain strategic alignment and, perhaps,
an opportunity that was missed as a result. Though
upper managers and supervisors consistently described
the importance of employees understanding and supporting strategic decisions, a number of barriers were
described. The comments shown next illustrate management’s beliefs about employees’ ability to understand (1), and their level of interest (2), the need to
avoid conflict (3), and management’s inability to communicate effectively (4).
(1) “They wouldn’t understand it [why there are
cuts]. I know they wouldn’t. For example, when
we are going through a rate case and the company is looking for a number—the union
doesn’t understand how that plays in the organization. All they see is millions of dollars that
the company is making and don’t see why they
should have to take a cut—not the same knowledge base.”
(2) “I don’t think the union cares about the mission. They just want to know what their job is
on a daily basis.”

(3) “If something happens, and if management
doesn’t explain everything, union management
will react negatively.”
(4) “We tried to simplify it down for great understanding, but at the end of the day when you
try to explain how and why you need to do
things, it’s not easily understood. For example,
managers would sit down with the employees … including nonunion employees … in
large meetings with the shops which were supposed to be carried down to the supervisors. As
the message goes down, it gets diluted.”
Counter to management’s beliefs about limited interest, union employees consistently expressed a desire to
know more about strategic goals and decisions, in addition to wanting greater clarity on day-to-day issues such
as workflow, scheduling, and supervisor expectations.
Unfortunately, we did not have the opportunity to
observe either party’s ability in these interactions.
In contrast to this first event, the launch of the new
safety program by Company D was successful in involving employees in all stages of the decision and in
achieving a greater level of clarity about what the company was attempting to do and why. As such, the safety
program was generally perceived favorably and frequently used to exemplify positive cultural elements,
such as empowerment and collaboration.
At the same time, it was interesting to note how the
implementation of the program faced old cultural barriers and also became the source of new conflicts. For
example, the gains in empowerment among union
employees were experienced as a loss of power among
supervisors, and eventually, safety was experienced as
a new arena for disciplinary action from the union
employee perspective and an impediment to performance management from the supervisor perspective.
This once again underscores the multiplicity of cultural
perceptions, interpretations, and attributions, even
when in reference to the same organizational event.
Reflecting on these cultural artifacts, it is possible to
speculate that each strategic decision or change in
organizations has a cascading impact on the culture
that both is difficult to see and might carry a blend of
intended and unintended consequences that will differ
between people and subgroups. It is also important to
remember that these decisions and changes do not
emerge from a vacuum but rather are informed and
shaped by the old norms and expectations. From
a culture perspective, this draws to mind the metaphor
of an underwater geyser. The way the geyser emerges
and eventually reaches the surface is influenced and in
some ways constrained by the surrounding water and
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ecosystem. At the surface, the geyser creates a ripple
effect with near and distant implications for the continued evolution of the ecosystem. And throughout this
evolution, the new features that are created interact
with the old features that persist. We observed this
quite clearly in the form of resistance to changing the
old beliefs and attitudes about the “impossibility of
collaborating with the union” despite new modes of
collaboration that were emerging.
Limitations
We acknowledge several limitations of the present
research. First, we recognize that our use of a crosssectional design limits our ability to identify with confidence the processes that resulted in the culture gaps.
Moreover, participants’ memory and recall of the historical events described are subject to inaccuracy and
bias. We attempted to mitigate these possibilities whenever possible by asking study participants for specific
examples and by focusing our analysis and description
on the most salient and frequent themes and examples
that were provided. Future studies could use similar
methods collected over multiple time points and also
incorporate new methods, such as diaries or archival
analysis, to more deeply elucidate the dynamics of
hierarchical culture gaps. A related limitation was the
lack of performance measures or other possible individual and organizational outcomes of culture gaps. As
previously noted, future studies could offer new
insights by more explicitly testing the relationship
between culture gaps and criterion measures over time.
Second, there were a few noteworthy limitations of
our study sample. In our quantitative analysis, the
uneven distribution of employees across the subgroups and companies, including one company in
which we could not identify upper managers, led to
unequal cell sizes, which can be a detriment to statistical power within the analysis of variance (ANOVA)
framework. Similarly, a fully crossed research design,
with union and nonunion representation at each hierarchical level, would provide a stronger basis for disentangling the effects of hierarchy and union
membership. However, we note that both of these
features—equal cell sizes and fully crossed design—
may be difficult to achieve when studying real organizational settings. Most notably, in the present study
there were no union members among the supervisor
and upper manager subgroups. The possibility of
unionized employees among supervisor or manager
subgroups in other companies should be considered
in future research: Subgroup differences, or the lack
thereof, in these situations would help better identify
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the extent to which perceptions of cultural differences
are due to unionization or hierarchical level.
Our study is also limited by the use of
a convenience sample. In our qualitative analysis in
particular, our access was limited to a smaller subsample of the companies and subgroups from the
archival analysis. An improved design for a future
study would entail using a fully matched sample
across the two components, thereby allowing for
stronger triangulation and complementarity (Greene,
Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Yauch & Steudel, 2003).
From a similar perspective, it would have been advantageous to have a shorter temporal distance between
the collection of the survey data and the qualitative
data. Though we do not believe this compromised
our ability to illustrate some of the important historical context and events “underneath” the measured
culture perceptions, we nevertheless remind readers
to be cautious against overgeneralizing from the stories and examples provided.
Cautions regarding generalizability are also warranted based on our study’s focus within a single industry (i.e., utilities), which operates within a mainly
unionized and blue-collar environment and has specific
forms of federal regulation and oversight. Though our
decision to focus within a specific context was intentional and, we believe, allowed us to make richer and
more contextualized observations, it will be important
for future studies to compare culture gaps across different industry and organizational settings, including
private-sector companies with a higher proportion of
professionalized occupations and job types. In addition,
we believe it will be of particular interest to select
a range of companies for more systematic comparisons
on the basis of the types and degrees of culture gaps
that are observed using surveys or other screening
methods.

Conclusion
This study demonstrated culture gaps between union
employees and other hierarchical subgroups along
a number of performance-linked culture traits. The findings illustrated how these subgroups perceived strong
differences in the degree to which the culture is empowering of its people, sets a clear and compelling mission,
aligns people around a common set of values, and
focuses on the customer. Our qualitative analysis further
demonstrated how the subgroups differed in their interpretation of the culture and their experience of a unique
set of challenges attributed to common events. By contrasting participants’ description of two key management decisions from the past—one described as having
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mainly negative consequences and the other described as
mainly positive—we surfaced important differences in
how the union employees were involved in the decisions
and the level of clarity that was achieved.
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